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Abstract 
That federalism is ‘one of the best known and tested strategies for managing territorially delineated diversity’ is 
perhaps not contestable. Federalism varies from place to place, and from time to time, and the federalness of a 
system as well as its suitability and viability can only be determined by relating the system to the nature of the 
plural society it serves at a given point in time (Osaghae, 2006). However, where it is practiced faithfully 
federalism accords a system a dual advantage of managing deep seated diversity as well as providing a tendency 
for rapid development to all the nooks and crannies of the territory under federal practice. Federalism affords 
local (territorial, regional, provincial, state, or municipal) units of government, as well as a national government 
the opportunity ‘to make final decisions with respect to at least some governmental activities and whose 
existence is specially protected’. In a fundamental sense, this decentralization attribute of federalism creates 
opportunities for ‘separate self-sustaining centres of power, prestige and profit’ with a high likelihood of 
translating into sustainable development. In other words, ‘it is not by the concentration of powers, but by their 
distribution, that good government is effected. We are in total agreement with this observation. 
Be that as it may, the operation of federal system of government in Nigeria since demise of first 
republic (1960-66) has been characterized by serious anomalies that authors and scholars have coined such 
words as ‘quasi federal’, ‘military federalism’, ‘unitary federalism, etc, in describing Nigerian system of 
federalism. It is even contended that ‘the federal framework in Nigeria from inception in 1954 has been fraught 
with a number of anomalies that tend to make federal practice in the country rather problematic’ This is in spite 
of wide acknowledgment that a federal system is more suitable for Nigeria than any other system. Among such 
unfederal practices are hyper centralization of power and resources, increasing fiscal and governmental 
dependency of the lower tiers of government, the over bearing posture of the federal centre, uncontrollable 
overlapping jurisdictions by tiers of government, a total lack of autonomy by the organs and tiers of government, 
etc. all of which collectively and individually erode the concept of co-ordinate supremacy, a critical element of 
federal system. Thus, by many accounts there is subversion of federalism in Nigeria, and this has constituted the 
greatest threat to Nigeria’s unity and survival as a nation-state, to its lack of democracy and has continued to 
undermine efforts at achieving sustainable development. 
 This paper examines and documents the sources, causes, and consequences of all unfederal practices 
in Nigeria since post 1966 era. By the nature of this topic, secondary data sourced from library, internet sites, and 
government publications are mainly used in this paper, and content analysis is used in analyzing the data.  
Keywords:  Unfederal practices, Nigerian Governments, Good Governance, Sustainable Development 
 
Introduction 
Nigeria, like many other countries across the globe is a culturally/ racially divided society with entrenched 
inequalities. While Nigeria’s population is estimated at slightly over 140 million (2006 Population and Housing 
Census), the country is estimated to have between 250 and 400 ethnic groups depending on the criteria used1. 
Suberu (2000) asserts that Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in all regions and climes of the 
world, and that some of the ethnic groups are bigger than many states of contemporary Africa. These ethnic 
groups are broadly divided into ethnic ‘majorities’ and ethnic ‘minorities’. The numerically – and politically – 
majority ethnic groups are the composite Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the southwest, and the Igbo of 
the southeast. The three majority ethnic groups constituted 57.8% of the national population in the 1963 census2.   
According to Mustapha (2007), the numerical and hegemonic strength of these three ethnic groups 
within the Nigerian federation has meant that Nigeria has a tripodal ethnic structure, with each of the three 
majority ethnic groups constituting a pole in the competition for political and economic resources. He observes, 
rightly, that the ethnic minorities are forced to form a bewildering array of alliances around each of the three 
                                                          
1 A total of 374 ethnic groups were identified by the eminent sociologist Otite (1990). 
2 For purely political reasons, the 2006 Population and Housing Census did not contain variables on ethnicity  and religion of 
Nigerians. This made it difficult to estimate the composition of different ethnic groups in Nigeria.  
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dominant ethnicities. Tripodal ethnic structures are inherently unstable, especially compared to countries like 
Tanzania which has a fragmented ethnic structure. In Tanzania, no ethnic group constitutes more than 12% of the 
population (Nyang’oro, 2006), so alliance building is the norm in politics. By contrast, ethnic politics in tripodal 
Nigeria is often conflictual as each of the three hegemonic groups tries to build up sufficient alliances to ensure 
its preponderance in government, or to prevent its being marginalised by competing alliance. Elsewhere, 
Mustapha also notes that “the interplay between this tripodal ethnic structure on the one hand, and administrative 
divisions and communal identities on the other, has led to eight major cleavages in Nigerian political 
life”(Mustapha, 1986), the most important of which are: the cleavages between the three majority groups; 
between the three majority ethnic groups on the one hand and the 350-odd minority ethnic groups on the other; 
between the north and south; between the 36 states of the federation and the six zones – three in the north and 
three in the south – into which they are grouped; and finally, between different religious affiliations. We agree 
completely with this apt observation about structure and inter-play of variables of political powers in Nigeria. 
In the words of Ojo (2009), it is not a surprise that ethnic groups in Nigeria are always in conflict and 
competition over resources. According to him, this is not unexpected in ethnically defined constituencies. He 
argues that by definition, ethnic groups compete for the strategic resources of their respective societies. This 
occurs because ethnic groups are socio-cultural entities which, while inhabiting the same state, country, or 
economic area, consider themselves biologically, culturally, linguistically, or socially distinct from each other 
and most often view their relations in actual or potentially antagonistic terms. In an important sense, the feeling 
of antagonism among ethnic group is often fuelled by fear of real or perceived marginalization. 
 
Defining a Federal Government 
A federal form of government has a multiorder structure, with all orders of government having some 
independent as well as shared decision-making responsibilities (Shah, 2009). Thus, a federation is simply a 
multilevel system of government in which different levels of government exist, each of which has some 
independent authority to make decisions within its jurisdiction.  Federalism represents either a “coming together” 
or a “holding together” of constituent geographic units to take advantage of the greatness and smallness of 
nations. More recently, Robert Inman (2007: 530) noted that “the word ‘federal’ has come to represent any form 
of government that brings together, in an alliance, constituent governments each of which recognizes the 
legitimacy of an overarching central government to make decisions on some matters once exclusively the 
responsibility of individual member states” (Shah, 2009). “Coming together” has been the guiding framework 
for mature federations such as the United States, Canada, and, more recently, the European Union.  
The alternative “holding together” view of federalism, also called “new federalism,” represents an 
attempt to decentralize responsibilities to state-local orders of government with a view to overcoming regional 
and local discontent with central policies (Shah, 2009:6). This view is the driving force behind the current 
interest in principles of federalism in unitary countries and in relatively newer federations such as Brazil and 
India and emerging federations such as Iraq, Spain, and South Africa.  
A federal form of government promotes decentralized decision making and, therefore, is conducive to 
greater freedom of choice, diversity of preferences in public services, political participation, innovation, and 
accountability (Shah, 2009:6). It is also better adapted to handle regional conflicts. Such a system, however, is 
open to a great deal of duplication and confusion in areas of shared rule and requires special institutional 
arrangements to secure national unity, ensure regional equity, and preserve an internal common market.  
Federal countries broadly conform to one of two models: dual federalism or cooperative federalism. 
Under dual federalism, the responsibilities of the federal and state governments are separate and distinct. 
According to Riker (1964: 11), under such a system, (1) “two levels of government rule the same land and the 
people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee of 
the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.” Under cooperative federalism, the responsibilities of 
various orders are mostly interlinked. Under both models, fiscal tiers are organized so that the national and state 
governments have independent authority in their areas of responsibility and act as equal partners. National and 
state governments often assume competitive, non cooperative roles under such an arrangement. Dual federalism 
takes either the layer cake or coordinate-authority approach (Shah, 2009:6). Under the layer cake model 
practiced in Mexico, Malaysia, and Russia, there is a hierarchical (unitary) type of relationship among the 
various orders of government. The national government is at the apex, and it has the option to deal with local 
governments either through state governments or more directly. Local governments do not have any 
constitutional status: they are simply extensions of state governments and derive their authority from state 
governments. In the coordinate-authority model of dual federalism, states enjoy significant autonomy from the 
federal government, and local governments are simply handmaidens of the states and have little or no direct 
relationship with the federal government. The working of the federations of Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan, 
and the United States resembles the coordinate-authority model of dual federalism.  
The cooperative federalism model has, in practice, taken three forms: interdependent spheres, marble 
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cake, and independent spheres. In the interdependent spheres variety as practiced in Germany and South Africa 
(a unitary country with federal features), the federal government determines policy, and the state and local 
governments act as implementation agents for federally determined policies. In view of federal domination of 
policy making, state or provincial governments in this model have a voice in federal policy making through a 
second chamber (the upper house of the parliament). In Germany and South Africa, the second-order (state) 
governments are represented in the upper house of the national parliament (the Bundesrat and the Council of the 
Provinces, respectively). In the marble cake model of cooperative federalism, various orders of government have 
overlapping and shared responsibilities, and all constituent governments are treated as equal partners in the 
federation. Belgium, with its three territorial and four linguistic jurisdictions, has a strong affinity with this 
approach. Finally, in a model of cooperative federalism with independent spheres of government, all orders of 
government enjoy autonomous and equal status and coordinate their policies horizontally and vertically. Brazil is 
the only federation practicing this form of federalism.  
The competitive federalism model is a theoretical construct advanced by the fiscal federalism literature 
and not yet practiced anywhere in its pure form. According to this construct, all orders of government should 
have overlapping responsibilities, and they should compete both vertically and horizontally to establish their 
clientele of services. Some analysts argue that such a competitive framework would create leaner and more 
efficient governments that would be more responsive and accountable to people.  
Countries with a federal form of government vary considerably in terms of federal influence on sub 
national governments. Such influence is very strong in Australia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, and 
Pakistan; moderately strong in Nigeria and the United States; and weak in Brazil, Canada, and Switzerland. In 
the last group of countries, national control over sub national expenditures is quite limited, and sub national 
governments have considerable authority to determine their own tax bases and tax rates. In centralized 
federations, conditional grants by the federal government play a large role in influencing the priorities of the 
state and local governments. In Australia, a centralized federation, the federal government is constitutionally 
required to follow regionally differentiated policies.  
Federal countries also vary according to sub national influence on national policies. In some countries, 
there is a clear separation of national and sub national institutions (“executive” or “interstate” federalism), and 
the two orders interact through meetings of officials and ministers, as in Australia and Canada. In Germany and 
South Africa, state or provincial governments have a direct voice in national institutions (“intrastate” federalism). 
In the United States, regional and local coalitions play an important role in the Congress. In some federal 
countries, constitutional provisions require all legislation to recognize that ultimate power rests with the people. 
For example, all legislation in Canada must conform to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 
Switzerland, a confederation by law but a federal country in practice, major legislative changes require approval 
by referendum. Such direct-democracy provisions indirectly reinforce the decentralized provisions of public 
services. In all federal countries, local government influences on the federal and state governments remain un-
institutionalized and weak. 
Barry Weingast (2009) has advanced a theoretical concept for comparative analyses of federal systems. 
Titled “Market-preserving federalism”, this concept is put forth as an ideal form of federal system in which (1) 
multiple governments have clearly delineated responsibilities; (2) sub national governments have primary 
authority over public goods and services for local autonomy; (3) the federal government preserves the internal 
common market; (4) all governments face the financial consequences of their decisions (hard budget constraints); 
and (5) political authority is institutionalized (Shah, 2009). We shall apply some elements of market preserving 
federalism in the analysis of federal practice in Nigeria since 1954 when federal practice officially commenced 
in Nigeria  
 
Unfederal Practices in Nigeria.  
Albeit most classical federations have two orders of government, namely the federal and the 
state/provincial/regional government, yet in a few federations (Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa), the 
municipal or local order of government is also established within the constitution. Nigeria is a three-layer 
federation made up of one federal government, 36 states(and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and 774 local 
government councils. Thus, the operation of federalism in the country is among these three tiers of government. 
In this section, we examine a number of issues that border on the relationship of these tiers of government and 
the attendant pervasion of federalism in Nigeria. These issues collectively define the structure, nature and 
character of federal system prevalent in Nigeria.  
1. Over centralized governmental powers 
In ideal federation, tiers of government are expected to operate as coordinate supreme and coequal. Each is 
expected to stay within the limit of its constitutional powers in terms of governmental responsibilities and 
resources to execute those mandates. Be that as it may, the operation of Nigerian system of federalism since the 
collapse of the first republic in 1966 has contradicted this golden federal rule. There has been considerable 
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overconcentration of governmental powers at the centre, thereby eroding many of the powers of sub federal units. 
A cursory study of the legislative list shows clearly that there has been a progressive addition to the mandates of 
the federal government as contained in the exclusive legislative list. For instance, this list increased from less 
than 30 items in the 1960 constitution to over 70 items in the 1999 constitution.   
The continuous increase in the mandates of the federal government is not without justification. In the 
contemporary literature, it is widely argued by economists that the principles and practice of public finance 
which concentrates functions and power in the hands of the federal government will accelerate economic 
development.  This, they argue, is because classical federalism creates less-than-optimum allocation of resources.  
Besides, economists contend that classical federalism prevents economies of scale in government and increases 
cost of administration.  Furthermore, proponents of centralization believe that the conventional macro-economic 
favours centralisation and integration of fiscal powers which enables the economy to combat depression and 
inflation.  It was in this regard that Hanson and Perloff (1965) argued that autonomous taxing borrowing and 
spending activities of the state and local governments collectively have typically run counter to an economically 
sound fiscal policy of the central government and have therefore intensified the violence of economic fluctuation.  
They were of the view that unless the states’ fiscal systems “are planned in relation to the federal stabilisation 
programmes, they are likely to nullify in large measure the national counter-cyclical activities”. 
One clearly distinguishable feature of a federal system is that units of government operate and relate as 
coordinate supreme, meaning that since each derives its powers and functions from the same source, usually, the 
constitution; there is really no master and no servant. The Nigerian system of federalism deviates greatly from 
this practice. In fiscal centralism, which best describes the Nigerian situation since the period of monocentric oil 
economy in the 1970s, revenue allocation and fiscal policies are left at the total control of the central government. 
In other words, the central government makes fiscal policies and allocates revenue to constituent units on the 
basis of criteria decided by it. This essentially is fiscal centralism and is largely the product of a convoluted 
resource allocation framework, weakness of existing fiscal policies and the desire of the central leadership to 
assume control of resources. This is contrary to the situation in a state with fiscal federalism that ideally goes 
with a federal system of government. In fiscal federalism, the federal state shares fiscal policy making with the 
constituent units or regions/states and this includes the nature of revenue allocation. In this case, fiscal policy is 
devolved to the constituent units that make up the federation and they share this responsibility with the central 
government. More than this, fiscal federalism connotes recognition of the different contributions of each unit in a 
federation to the national revenue in the process of allocation (Anugwom, 2001). However, the Nigeria’s system 
of federalism is such that contributions of sub federal tiers are insignificant to have any meaningful impact on 
the operation of the federal system. Essentially, this situation has been caused by a number of factors some of 
which are explained below:  
a. The centre predominates in the allocation and control of the national wealth.  
One of the major areas of the perversion of the Nigerian federal system is the overwhelming reliance of all 
governments (federal, states and local) on the centrally collected oil revenues.  This situation was made possible 
because of the nature of revenue mobilization in the country which is highly central, reflecting the centralizing 
imperative of the military that has ruled the country for a greater part of the period of its post- colony. Thus, the 
long period of military rule and the interplay of ethno-regional redistributive politics have cumulatively ensured 
the transformation of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism to that of fiscal centralism, with profound implications on the 
nature of sub federal autonomy and sustainable national development. 
Again, in federal system of government, each level of government is expected to be allocated specific 
governmental responsibilities and given adequate resources to allow it discharge its responsibilities. Because this 
is not the case in Nigeria yet, there is a lack of correspondence between the spending responsibilities and the tax 
powers/revenue sources assigned to different levels of government. It is this incongruence that is often referred 
to as the non-correspondence problem.  In Nigeria, most of the major sources of revenue come under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Government yet lower levels of government are suppose to generate internal revenue. 
There is, therefore, the need to resolve the imbalance between assigned functions and tax powers.  
b. Federal government’s subversion of  revenue allocation laws 
Essentially, the federal government of Nigeria is known to be consistently subverting revenue allocation laws, 
with implications on the share of the sub federal units in the federation account. It is the cumulative effects of all 
these practices that has led to the description of Nigeria’s system of public finance as that of fiscal centralism, 
which has been made possible because  of the “continuing ability of the federal government to subvert revenue 
allocation laws owing to its position as the sole collector  and custodian of all major inter-governmental 
revenues”, a situation which naturally leads to financial vulnerability of the sub-national governments, especially 
the local governments (Suberu, 2006). Till date, a widely-accepted vertical and horizontal formula is yet to be 
institutionalised as both the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) and Federation 
Account Allocation Committee (FAAC), the institutions established to superintend the collection and sharing of 
revenue in Nigeria, are characterised by political manoeuvrings (Oladeji, 2014). In particular, the federal 
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government is always opposed to any sharing formula proposal that purportedly reduces its allocation. This over-
centralized revenue mobilization and allocation has been the basis for many of the inter governmental crisis 
prevalent in the country since post 1966 era.  
 
2. Lack of Autonomy for sub federal Governments 
As already alluded to, Nigeria operates a three-tier federal system1.  The 1999 Constitution of the federal 
republic of Nigeria was modelled after the American Presidential system which recognizes three tiers of 
government namely the Federal Government, the State Government and the Local Government. However, the 
operation of Nigeria federal system since demise of first republic in 1966 has been such that scholars and 
observers wonder if Nigeria can be correctly described as a federal republic. As the lack of autonomy affects 
both the state and local governments, we use one case each to illustrate the subversion of the federal system in 
Nigeria as follows, (i) the minimum wage issue for the state government, and (ii) the creation, existence and 
administration of local councils for the third tier of government.  
2.a. Minimum Wage Palaver  
The issue of fixing of minimum wage centrally by the federal government is yet another in the series of 
perversion of federal system of government in Nigeria. Also related to this is the issue of fixing and conduct of 
general election by independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In ideal federal systems, both of these 
issues are essentially state matters on which the federal government is NOT expected to interfere. In Nigeria, 
however, federal interference on these issues are prominent and well pronounced. On the issue of the on-going 
negotiation for a national minimum wage, President Goodluck Jonathan, without minding the principle of 
federalism appeared to have coerced all the 36 state governments into reaching an agreement on the payment of 
this wage. The president declared that “All state governors must pay the new minimum wage”(cited in Saturday 
tribune, 21/5/2011:33). Indeed this presidential declaration is without prejudice to the state of financial viability 
and commitments of the affected states. 
Expectedly, many state governors are not comfortable with this presidential, but highly unfederal practice which 
many of them described as “unsolicited trouble” (ibid). The governors therefore, and justifiably so, have 
demanded for an upward review of their statutory allocation if they must join the new minimum wage train. 
According to Lagos State governor, Babatunde Raji Fashola state governments’ share of national revenue must 
be increased to 42% (from the present 26.72%) if many of them will be able to pay the new wage to the workers. 
In his words:  
“in order that the newly approved minimum wage be effective and sustained and for the states to be 
able to function and provide basic social services, the adoption and implementation of the 
recommendation to amend the revenue allocation formula was a precondition that will help the state 
Governors stem any labour crisis...Not all states will be able to pay the new minimum wage structure 
unless there is an urgent amendment of the country’s revenue allocation formula that gives more money 
to the States and Local Governments”(Saturday Tribune, 21/5/2011:33). 
It is expected that such issues as those of minimum wage should have been left to the state government to handle. 
The central handling of this apparently state matter suggests that the sub federal units in Nigeria lack autonomy 
in sensitive matters. This is injurious to the operation of federalism and aspiration for sustainable development in 
Nigeria 
2.b. Creation and Existence of Local Governments Councils 
The 1999 Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria tends to provide for a full fledge democratic Local 
Government system, when in section 7(1) it provides that:  
The system of Local Government by democratically elected Local Government Councils is guaranteed 
under the Constitution and accordingly, the Government of every State shall, ensure their existence 
under a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such 
councils.  
The 1999 Constitution did not only give the numbers of all the local government areas in Nigeria but 
also clearly stated the names of all the Local Government Areas in all the States in Nigeria. The implication is 
that all the Local Governments in Nigeria are recognized by name and are vested with juristic personality by the 
Constitution.  
Regrettably, despite the fact that the Local Government system is constitutionally provided for as a 
third tier and autonomous of the other two, the Federal and State Governments have unwholesomely interfered in 
the operations of the local government system such that in some states, the local governments are reduced to a 
department of the state government. In most cases Local Governments’ statutory revenue allocation from the 
federation accounts are withheld unlawfully by the State Governments or Federal Government; and Local 
                                                          
1 In most classical federations only the federal and the states, variously called, regions/states/cantons etc) are recognised. 
Indeed, there is no single mention of local government in the entire constitution of the United State of America. 
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Government Councils are arbitrarily dissolved without allowing them to serve out their constitutional tenure.  
 Severally, the courts have intervened to declare some of the actions of the Federal and State Governments 
unconstitutional, null and void. This has greatly helped to preserve governance at the grassroots. Table 1 below 
contains some judicial interventions on issues concerning the existence and operations of local government in 
Nigeria.  
Table 1: Main Judicial Interventions on Issues Concerning the Existence and Operations of Local 
Government in Nigeria, 1999-2007 
S/N Citation Judgement Grounds of Judgement 
1 Attorney 
General, Lagos 
State v.  
Attorney 
General of the 
Federation 
The supreme court declared the Local 
Government Area Law No 5 of 2002 made 
by Lagos State Government in which 57 
local governments were created by 
breaking the existing 20 Local 
Government areas recognized under the 
1999 constitution into 57 Local 
Government Councils as unconstitutional 
null and void 
The Law in effect abolished Local 
Government Areas created under the 
1999 Constitution by altering their names, 
adjusting their boundaries and dividing 
them into smaller units. Thus no State 
House of Assembly could on its own 
create additional local government 
without involving the National Assembly 
which would then set the necessary 
machinery in motion for the amendment 
of section 3(6) of the 1999 Constitution.  
2 Attorney 
General, Lagos 
State v. 
Attorney 
General of the 
Federation 
The supreme court declared the decision of 
the Federal Government to withhold 
statutory allocation due and payable to the 
Lagos State Government in respect of the 
20 Local Governments is declared as null 
and void 
The federal Government has no right 
whatsoever to withhold allocations meant 
for another order of government 
3 Attorney 
General of 
Abia State & 
35 Ors v. 
Attorney 
General of the 
Federation 
The Supreme Court declared the Electoral 
Act made by the National Assembly in 
2001 as null and void 
The Act purported to legislate on the 
tenure of the Local Governments in 
Nigeria whereas that power was 
constitutionally reserved for the states 
Houses of Assembly.  
 
 
4 Attorney 
General 
Plateau State v. 
Goyol and 
8Ors  
and Attorney 
General Benue 
State v. Umar 
and 9Ors 
The Court of Appeal declared the actions 
of the Plateau State Governor and that of 
Benue State Governor respectively in 
dissolving the Local Government Councils 
in those States as unconstitutional, null and 
void 
The Laws made by the two States Houses 
of Assembly authorized the Governors to 
impede the smooth running of the Local 
Government Councils were inimical to 
the practice of federalism 
5 Attorney 
General Abia 
State & 2 Ors 
v. Attorney 
General 
Federation & 
Ors 
Supreme court held that the powers of the 
National Assembly over funds accruable to 
the Local Government Councils in Nigeria 
under sections 7(6) and 162(5) of the 1999 
Constitution is only limited to allocation of 
such funds and it did not extend to 
monitoring such funds. Therefore, the 
Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to 
Local Government Act which sought to 
monitor the revenue allocation to the local 
government councils was held to be 
unconstitutional 
Monitoring is a post-allocation matter and 
the National Assembly had no power to 
make such laws 
Source: Complied by Authors, 2011. 
One major issue that has dogged the civilian administration of the fourth republic is that of the creation 
of local councils by some states in the federation. The immediate bone of contention which is of relevance to this 
paper is in connection with the allocation of funds to the newly created councils. It will be recalled shortly after 
inauguration of new civilian administration, and in exercise of their constitutional powers on the issue, five State 
Governments announced the creation of additional councils in their respective states. An interesting political 
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dimension was immediately introduced to the whole issue, which is the influence of party system. This is not 
unexpected because in many federations, party policies strongly influence intergovernmental relations. In the 
United States, the Democratic and Republican political parties at both national and state levels have significant 
linkages between them and intergovernmental relations. In others, such as Canada, the relationships are weaker. 
In countries where one party has control of both national and sub national governments, such as the African 
National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria, etc internal party 
processes can often play a significant role in managing intergovernmental issues (See Neumann, Robinson, and 
Robinson, (2006:69) 
In obedience to party supremacy, four of the five states, namely Nassarawa, Kogi, Katsina and Niger, 
which were being controlled by the ruling party at the centre, the PDP, quickly reverted to the old number of 
local councils, but the fifth, Lagos state, which was under the control of one of the opposition parties in the 
country, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) refused to heed the advice of the federal government on the issue. 
The position of Lagos state was that it did not create any local government, but development areas, and that it 
followed strictly all the laid down constitutional procedure for the exercise. In other words, Lagos claimed that 
the creation of 37 Local Government Development Areas was based on laws validly enacted by the Lagos state 
house of Assembly pursuant to its legislative competence under the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of 
Nigeria. In the words of Fashola:  
“As the head of a State Government that is committed to the highest standards of 
constitutionalism and legality, I regret that I am unable to accede to your request to alter the 
current status quo by stopping the operation of the 37 Local Council Development 
Areas"(Response of Lagos state Government to the Federal Government’s order that the 
former reverts to its old 20 LG structure as contained in request). 
The Governor maintained that the laws on which the creation was done relate to (i) The creation of 
Local Government Areas Law No. 5 2002, (ii) The creation of New Local ( Amendment) Law No 15 at 2004, 
and (iii) The creation of New Local Government (Amendment) (No 2) Law of 2005. Therefore, the exercise was 
within the ambit of the law. 
Expectedly the matter became a subject of hot litigation between the two parties and the landmark 
judgment on the case is today referred to as the case of AG of Lagos State vs AG of the Federation (2005) 2 
WRN 1.  In the judgment delivered by Muhammed Uwais CJN, the Supreme Court held that:  
"Having read all the provisions of the Constitution aforementioned I am satisfied that the House of 
Assembly of Lagos State has the right to pass the creation of Local Government Areas (Amendment) 
Law 2004" See AG Lagos v. AG Federation & Ors.  
His Lordship further noted that:  
"... the Laws are valid but inchoate until the necessary steps as provided by the Constitution are taken 
by the National Assembly"  
This position is also supported by the judgment of Iguh JSC when his Lordship held that:  
"I have therefore no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Lagos State Government's Law No.5 
of 2002 is unquestionably constitutional and having complied with the provision of sections 7(1) and 
8(3) of the Constitution." see AG Lagos v. AG Federation & Ors.  
Consequently the Supreme Court held that “there is no conflict between the Laws under which the new Local 
Council Development Areas were created and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."  
However, in the period the litigation lasted, the Obasanjo-led federal government withheld allocations meant for 
the 20 Local Government councils of Lagos state under the guise that the state was using allocations to the 
constitutionally recognized 20 councils to fund the new (unrecognized) ones. Shortly after assumption of office 
in May 2007, President Yar’Adua ‘s administration, which carved for itself an administration that believes in 
rule of law, ordered the release of all allocations meant for the Lagos Local Government councils. This step, 
popular as it was, did not completely resolve the imbroglio as the same federal government, under the same 
President Yar’Adua demanded that Lagos state government should revert back to its original structure a few 
months after. As expected, the matter also dragged to the court. Thus, till date, the structure of Lagos state 
government is still largely a matter of contestation. 
 
3. Resource Control Palaver. 
Another issue indicative of the perversion of the federal system in Nigeria is that of control of resources among 
tiers of government. Again, like many other issues, this became a problem sequel to the aftermath of military 
rule that ended the first republic. It would be recalled that during the first republic (1960-66), the Nigerian 
federation functioned very well, allowing the federating regions the control of own resources, with appropriate 
taxes paid to the central purse. Essentially, the principle of derivation featured prominently in the horizontal 
revenue allocation in the first republic, and it allowed each region to receive revenue from the central 
government in proportion to its contribution to the centrally collected revenue. As the principle tended to give 
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more revenues only to states where natural resources were available, it became a highly controversial issue as 
some of the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria are without such natural resource as crude oil. As a result of this, it 
was contended that application of derivation principle tended to promote regional hostility and disunity because 
of the uneven distribution of natural resources across the country. Naturally, this led to over politicization of the 
principle of revenue allocation in the country.  
The most recent development in the struggle for the control of oil resources in Nigeria was the recent 
Supreme Court action instituted by the Federal Government against the oil producing states with respect to the 
offshore/ onshore oil dichotomy. The April 2002 decision of the Supreme Court to exclude the revenue derived 
from offshore drilling in the calculation of the revenue attributable to the oil producing states based on the 
derivation principle, has failed to resolve the controversy. There arose a dispute between the Federal 
Government on the one hand and the eight littoral States of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Lagos, 
Ogun, Ondo and Rivers States on the other hand as to the Southern (or seaward) boundary of each of these States. 
The Federal Government contends that the southern (or seaward) boundary of each of these States is the low 
water mark of the land surface of such State… [or] the seaward limit of inland waters within the State, as the 
State so requires. The Federal Government, therefore, maintains that natural resources located within the 
Continental Shelf of Nigeria are not derivable from any State of the Federation. The eight littoral States do not 
agree with the Federal Governments’ contentions. Each state claims that its territory extend beyond the low-
water mark onto the territorial water and even unto the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. The 
states maintain that natural resources derived from both onshore and offshore are derivable from their respective 
territory and in respect thereof each is entitled to the “not less than 13 percent” allocation as provided in the 
proviso to subsection (2) of section 162 of the Constitution” (Judgment by the Supreme Court, 5 April 2002). 
As a way of reducing the effect of the Supreme Court verdict, the president acting on the 
recommendations of the committee set up to study the implication of the Supreme Court judgement sent a bill to 
the National Assembly seeking to abolish the dichotomy between onshore and offshore in the application of the 
principle of derivation (Ogbodo, 2004). However, by November 2002, the harmonised position reached by the 
Joint Conference of the National Assembly was that the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone 
contiguous to a state of the federation shall be deemed to be part of that state for the purposes of computing the 
revenue accruing to the federation account from that state pursuant to the provisions of constitution of the 
republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other enactment. The president did not however concede to this but by January 
2004 he suggested 24 nautical miles as areas onshore that the littoral states could benefit from. 
Making further clarification, the president made it clear that there was not much production of crude oil 
beyond 24 nautical miles and he therefore suggested in the new bill 200m water depth and he further claimed 
that all existing producing oil areas found in the country are located within the 200 meter water depth isobath. 
This was eventually signed into law and it had resulted in much jubilation to the littoral states. But hardly had 
this been done by the Federal government than the 22 governors filed a suit at the Supreme Court against the 
littoral states. The 22 governors were seeking a declaration that the Onshore/ Offshore Abrogation Act enacted 
by the National Assembly was unconstitutional and equally that there 
should be a stoppage to further payments to the littoral states of the derivation benefits from offshore oil 
exploitations. Meanwhile, the Guardian opinion was sympathetic with the littoral states and enjoined the 22 
governors to withdraw the suit from the Supreme Court (Anikulapo, 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
In concluding this paper, we observe that although Nigeria’s federal experience is outstanding in Africa (Suberu, 
2009:1; Keller, 2002:21)), yet there are numerous problems with the operation of the Nigerian system of 
federalism, and these problems account for the country’s inability to achieve sustainable growth, development 
and progress 50 years after self rule. Among others, the over centralization of powers and resources and the 
decimation of sub federal levels, which lack autonomy in administrative and fiscal terms, and problems that 
surround control of resources are principal areas of contestations in the  federation. The result is that Nigerian 
system of federalism has continued to violate all known laws of federal arrangement. Federations are expected to 
operate in such a way that units are coordinate with the centre, and have independent sources of resources to 
guarantee autonomy. This is not yet the case in Nigeria as sub federal levels, namely the state and local 
government councils, even though derive their powers and functions from the same constitution where the 
federal government derives its own, are made to function as administrative appendages of the federal 
government. 
Nigeria’s problems with operation of federalism largely reflect the structure and character of the union. 
Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in all regions and climes of the world, with a population of 
over 140 million, and ethnic groups of between 250 and 400. Thus, the issue of political accommodation of the 
many ethnic groups has become central in order to avoid crisis occasioned by fear of marginalization of certain 
ethnic groups in the country. It is in attempt at ensuring that crises occasioned by its severe cleavages do not 
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consume the union that measures have been taken by governments, particularly military regimes, to enforce 
unity in the system. The enforced solutions to the problems of Nigeria’s federalism have, unfortunately, 
destroyed the operations of the system, particularly in terms of over centralization of powers and resources. Be 
that as it may, for all its shortcomings, the fact that Nigeria has continued to exist as one indivisible entity after 5 
decades of self-rule is indicative of success in its conflict management mechanisms since independence. 
 
Recommendation:  
As a way forward, this paper recommends that Nigeria should go back to the operation of ‘true’ federalism as 
was the case in the first republic, when the units operated as coordinate supreme with federal government and 
there was considerable decentralization of powers and resources. It is no gainsaying that the level of 
development Nigeria recorded at this period has remained unmatched even till date. 
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